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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to estimate the type of selection that exists in the voluntary health 
insurance market in Colombia where the compulsory coverage is implemented through a 
managed care competition. We build a panel database that combines individuals’ information 
from the Ministry of Health and a database provided by two private health insurers. We 
perform the correlation test for health expenditure and coverage. Following Fang et al. (2008), 
we condition the estimation on health controls that are available to the econometrician but not 
to insurers. In both cases we obtain a positive correlation, suggesting that adverse selection 
predominates. In order to rule out some moral hazard effects, we estimate the correlation 
between previous health service consumption and insurance purchase. The positive correlation 
obtained is robust to the inclusion of controls for diagnosis, suggesting that despite some risk 
selection strategies, health insurers are not protected from adverse selection.  
 
  
JEL code: D82, I13, G22. 
Keywords: Information asymmetry, Health insurance, Adverse Selection, Correlation test. 
 
	 	
                                                            
1 Universidad de Los Andes (Bogotá). Department of Economics. Toulouse School of Economics. Address: Calle 
19A No 1‐37 Este. Bloque W Of. 810 (Bogotá). Tel: (57‐1) 3394949 Ext: 2415 E‐mail: d.bardey@uniandes.edu.co 
2 Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Bogotá). Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Biostatistics. Address: Cra. 
7 No. 40‐62 ‐ Hospital Universitario San Ignacio. Segundo Piso (Bogotá). Tel: (57‐1) 3208320 Ext. 2799. E‐mail: 
g_buitrago@javeriana.edu.co 
1. Introduction 
Health insurance markets are usually characterized by market failures caused by the presence 
of information asymmetries (Cutler, 2000). More precisely, the main information asymmetries 
described are related to the nature of selection on the one hand, and the presence of moral 
hazard on the other. The first of these occurs when individuals have private information prior 
to the purchase of insurance, and this information is correlated both with the purchase of 
insurance and the probability of the occurrence of an event (Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]; De 
Meza and Webb [2001]). In contrast, moral hazard is defined as an increase in the magnitude 
of pooled risk due to insurance (Pauly [1968]; Blomqvist [1997]). 
Basically, the types of selection described are divided in two groups: adverse and 
advantageous.3 In practice, insurers define risk categories using observable variables and they 
offer contracts calculated for the average risk within each category. Under an adverse selection 
scenario, (within each category) individuals with unobservable increased health risk are those 
who are more willing to buy insurance coverage. As such, adverse selection leads to equilibria 
characterized with under-insurance (Einav et al., 2010). Conversely, advantageous selection 
corresponds to scenarios in which individuals that prefer insurance with greater coverage 
exhibit a lower health risk (De Meza and Webb, [2001]; Hemenway [1990]).4 Unlike adverse 
selection, advantageous selection leads to equilibria characterized with over-insurance (Einav 
and Finkelstein, 2011). As a result, and indeed crucially, optimal regulation in health 
insurance markets depends on the nature of the selection at work. 
Beyond the inefficiencies just mentioned, the results of these asymmetries also have 
consequences for the design and outcomes of public policies in mixed health systems where 
public and private insurance markets coexist. In particular, Buitrago and Bardey (2015) show 
that the effect of subsidies for private insurance on public health depends on the nature of the 
selection that prevails in the market. More precisely, they point out that subsidies increase 
public spending in an advantageous selection scenario, while they tend to decrease it under 
adverse selection.  
It is due to these reasons that we aim to estimate the type of selection at play in the Colombian 
health system that allows for the coexistence in the market of private/voluntary insurance and 
compulsory insurance provided in a managed care system. This health system has created a 
series of incentives (subsidies) through tax cuts for individuals who want to have access to 
better quality health services through supplementary coverage.5 Using the integrated 
information system of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (SISPRO), and 
information from two health insurers that offer compulsory and supplementary (private) 
coverage, a panel is constructed for 2010 and 2011 of over 400,000 individuals who are dues-
paying members of the	 system (adult workers). This contains information regarding health 
                                                            
3 Another form of heterogeneity among individuals has been defined through which they can anticipate moral 
hazard behaviors before purchasing insurance, and this increases the likelihood of purchase. Einav et al. (2013) 
refer to this phenomenon as selection on moral hazard. 
4 The argument behind advantageous selection is that more risk averse individuals are usually more willing to 
undertake prevention activities that lower their health risk on the one hand, and more willing to buy generous 
insurance contracts on the other. 
5 Official figures for the health system in Colombia for 2012 show that 9.65% of individuals enrolled in the 
public insurance system are affiliated with a policy offered in the private system.   
services consumption, type of health service, spending and related diagnostics, socioeconomic 
variables, and affiliation or not to voluntary insurance. 
To begin with, we perform the test suggested in Chiappori and Salanié (2000) to determine the 
correlation between spending on health and insurance coverage.6 We find that the correlation 
test is positive, that is, the consumption of health services correlates positively with affiliation 
to voluntary insurance, suggesting the presence of information asymmetries. As explained by 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), from this test we are unable to disentangle adverse selection 
from moral hazard. Also, using the approximation of Fang et al. (2008) we condition the 
estimation on health controls such that trace pathologies, which provide a good proxy for the 
health of individuals. Such controls are available to the econometrician but not to insurers. In 
both cases, that is, with and without such controls, we obtain a positive correlation, suggesting 
that adverse selection predominates.  
However, this estimate may still include effects related to moral hazard behaviors. Thus, 
controlling by a set of individual characteristics, we take advantage of the consumption of 
health services in the year immediately preceding (supplementary) health insurance purchase. 
This strategy allows for the elimination of a moral hazard effect since the correlation is 
estimated when individuals have not yet purchased the insurance. Our results show that the 
use of hospital services in the year preceding insurance purchase is positively correlated with 
the purchase of insurance, corroborating that adverse selection is the predominant scenario in 
the private health insurance market in Colombia. This estimate is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for diagnosis (which correlate negatively with the purchase of insurance), suggesting 
that despite the strategies of risk selection used by health insurers these do not protect them 
from adverse selection.  
Finally, the activities of primary and secondary prevention realized by policyholders before 
the purchase of insurance are also taken into account. More precisely, consumption associated 
with the cervical Pap smear, mammogram, PSA measurement and vaccination are identified. 
The first three of these are related to activities of secondary prevention, while vaccination 
corresponds to primary prevention activities. It is assumed that primary prevention activities 
are positively correlated with advantageous selection, and negatively correlated with adverse 
selection, while secondary prevention activities are negatively correlated with advantageous 
selection (and positively with adverse selection).7 We find that there exists a positive 
correlation between the use of PSA and cervical-vaginal cytology with health insurance 
purchase in the following year and that this correlation is robust to socio-demographic, health 
status and service consumption controls. Moreover, the correlation between vaccination and 
the purchase of voluntary insurance remains negative for all estimates. Again, all of these 
results are suggestive of adverse selection.  
                                                            
6 We use the frequency of healthcare services such as the health consumption variable instead of health spending, 
which is related to price and affected by unknown factors.  
7 The intuition behind this statement is as follows: in scenarios of advantageous selection individuals undertake 
more activities that reduce the risk of disease (or the probability of its occurrence). In this case, the goal of 
vaccination is to prevent the occurrence of disease. On the contrary, in adverse selection the individual knows 
their risk of disease and so the use of secondary prevention activities plays two roles: first, the individual (or 
medical) receives a signal about his or her risk of getting sick, which leads to a greater probability of him or her 
using these services; second, according to the results, individuals propensity to buy insurance may increase 
because of knowledge of a more likely adverse outcome. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on asymmetries of information to identify the 
predominant selection scenario, taking into account the effects of moral hazard in the health 
insurance market (Finkelstein and McGarry [2006]; Cohen [2005]; Einav et al. [2010]; Einav 
et al. [2013]). Empirical tests for determining the existence and nature of the selection or 
moral hazard in the insurance market are difficult to develop. The difficulty is that adverse 
selection has similar consequences to moral hazard in the correlation test; in either of the two 
scenarios there is an increased use of services offered by insurance, therefore to isolate the two 
effects is not easy and it depends on the data available. Some empirical studies (Fang et al., 
2008; Resende and Zeidan, 2010) have been based on the correlation test for asymmetric 
information developed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000). This test estimates the correlation 
between the level of insurance coverage and the costs of making a claim. 
In performing this correlation test, Fang et al. (2008) identify that there exists asymmetric 
information in the private insurance market that is linked to Medicare in the United States. 
They propose an empirical strategy that involves comparing the sign associated with the 
correlation between coverage and health expenditures, including models without controls for 
the health status of individuals and models with controls (again only available to the 
econometrician). They argue that if the positive correlation test changes to a negative 
correlation in the health controls scenario then this is evidence of the existence of private 
information that suggests the presence of advantageous selection. 
The approach presented herein differs from that proposed by Einav et al. (2010), and although 
it is close to the proposals made by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Fang et al. (2008), it 
makes a contribution by supplementing these proposals in several aspects. First, we take 
advantage of the consumption of services prior to health insurance affiliation to rule out moral 
hazard behaviors. Thus the positive correlation between the consumption of health services 
and insurance purchase at a later time corroborates our result that adverse selection 
predominates in the supplementary health insurance market in Colombia. Second, this paper 
identifies the channels or type of private information that can be related to one or another form 
of selection. In particular, it considers the correlation between buying insurance and the use of 
activities of primary and secondary prevention. 
This article comprises five sections. The second section describes the sources of information 
and data. The third presents the identification strategy. The fourth shows the results of the 
empirical estimates and the fifth concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1. Information sources 
	
The main source of information is the Integrated Information System of Social Protection 
(SISPRO), which integrates more than 10 primary sources of health-related information in a 
single query system.8 SISPRO makes a match through the citizen identification of each of the 
                                                            
8  SISPRO handles quality standards and information validation, allowing for reliability with respect to those 
reported in each of the databases that SISPRO uses. More information: http://www.sispro.gov.co/ 
subjects included and this relates to the different sources of information. Using SISPRO we 
can build a database for 2010 and 2011 with information coming from three primary sources: 
BDUA, PILA and UPC.  
The first source is the BDUA: it corresponds to the database that contains information 
regarding those members fully identified with the different social security regimes. From this 
database we retrieve all of the individuals’ standard socioeconomic variables as well as 
information related to membership status. From PILA we extract individuals’ monthly 
incomes. Finally, from the UPC database we have information related to the consumption of 
healthcare services during a calendar year. In particular, this database contains information 
such as member ID and the characterization of the health service provided: place of delivery, 
delivery date, type of service provided, related diagnostic, health institution that provided the 
service, and value paid by the health insurer. 
Finally, the information panel was paired with information from two health insurers that offer 
the compulsory insurance as well as the supplementary coverage. Information for the two 
insurers is used to identify whether individuals benefited from supplementary coverage or 
not.9 This information was available for the years 2010 and 2011. In short, we build a panel 
database that contains information on an individual level for each of the health expenses paid 
by the compulsory coverage along with related diagnoses, demographic information of the 
individual and whether they benefited from supplementary coverage.10 
The total for matched individuals between the base obtained from SISPRO and the contents of 
the membership status for supplementary health insurance was 484,005 individuals (6.4% of 
contributors in Colombia), which corresponds to the total of dues-paying members of the two 
health insurers included. From the UPC database we identify the cost of services used, the 
frequency of use between inpatient and outpatient services, the diagnosis associated with the 
services used and whether the individual is affiliated with supplementary coverage or not. In 
addition, the frequency of use of primary and secondary prevention services (cervical Pap 
smear, mammogram, PSA measurement and vaccination) are characterized by the codes of the 
Unified Classification of Health Procedures (CUPS). The diagnostics used for health are blood 
pressure (hypertension), chronic kidney disease (CKD), diabetes mellitus (DM), cancer, 
pneumonia, urinary tract infection (UTI), preeclampsia, gastrointestinal disease, upper 
respiratory tract infection (URTI), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma and 
mental illness. 
 
 
                                                            
9 The match between the two databases was performed for affiliated contributors, that is to say, beneficiaries 
were not included in the final database. The members of the contributory system are divided into contributors (the 
workers who are deducted a percentage of their salary for health) and beneficiaries (those who are economically 
dependent on the contributor, usually a spouse and/or children). 
10  It is important to note that the information obtained regarding the status of affiliation to supplementary 
coverage relates uniquely and exclusively to that realized with the same insurer. That is, if the individual is 
enrolled in supplementary health coverage offered by a different health insurer from that which administers the 
obligatory plan then they cannot be found in the database. This implies that we may exhibit underreporting 
relative to the classification of being in a supplementary plan or not. However, different estimates for Colombia 
show that 97% of people who have supplementary coverage have a contract with the same company to which 
they are affiliated for the obligatory plan. 
2.2. Descriptive	statistics	
	
As shown in Table 1, 3.17% of contributing members bought a supplementary coverage. In 
general, the average age of the population was 37 years, being higher in affiliates of 
supplementary coverage (43 years on average). Likewise, there are more women than men in 
the study population. 40% of individuals of the database are female but this proportion is 
higher for individuals with supplementary coverage (54%). The average income is close to the 
legal minimum wage but is higher (17%) for individuals who benefit from supplementary 
coverage.  
It is also noted that there are not many differences between the diseases, although there are 
proportionally fewer people with chronic diseases that are affiliated with supplementary 
coverage. This may be due to entry restrictions to existing supplementary coverage. Finally, 
both the average consumption of health services (both ambulatory and hospital) and the 
average cost of services are higher in individuals affiliated with supplementary coverage 
(frequency of ambulatory services is 3.82 higher; frequency of hospital services is 1.2 higher; 
and average cost is 1.23 higher). 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
This paper aims to identify the nature of the selection that dominates in the voluntary health 
insurance market in Colombia. To this end, we first develop the same empirical strategy as 
Fang et al. (2008). Due to the fact that health spending is linked to the price that the insurer 
pays each provider, and that this price is affected by many factors that cannot be observed, the 
consumption of health services frequency is considered. We assume that the consumption of 
health services in 2011 is a function of having bought supplementary coverage, socio-
demographic characteristics, health status and previous health consumption of the individual. 
Using ordinary least squares, we estimate the following equation: 
 
௜ܻ,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ ൅ ߚଷܦݔ௜ ൅ ߚସ ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜, 
(1) 
where ௜ܻ,௧ is the consumption of health services for individual ݅ for 2011, which is measured in 
frequency use, ܯ ௜ܲ,௧ is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the individual is 
affiliated or not in 2011; ௜ܺ 	is a vector of the individual’s characteristics; ܦݔ௜ is the state of 
health of the individual through the diagnosis of certain trace pathologies and ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ	is the 
consumption of health services in the previous year. It is worth to note that both ܦݔ௜ and ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ 
are not observed by health insurers. In this estimation, our parameter of interest is ߚଵ. Its sign 
determines the correlation between having bought a supplementary coverage and the 
consumption of health services. 
Next, we estimate the following equation: 
ܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ݂ ቀܦݔ௜,	௧ିଵ, ܲ௜,	௧ିଵ, ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ, ௜ܺቁ, 
(2) 
where ܯܲ and ܺ are the same variables as in (1). ܦݔ and ܻ also denote the same variables as 
in (1) but taken in t-1. ܲ௜,	௧ିଵ, which is not observed by health insurers, measures the activities 
of primary and secondary prevention that the individual performs during the previous year.11 
Equation (2) is twofold: i) it allows us to identify the nature of the existing selection ruling out 
the presence of moral hazard12; ii) it describes the characteristics of individuals who purchase 
voluntary insurance (which may suggest the possible sources of asymmetric information).13 
The estimation for (2) is performed using a logit model. 
	
4. Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical estimation and is divided into three sub-
sections. The first shows the results related to the estimation of equation (1), which represents 
the correlation test (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000). The second sub-section describes the effects 
of the relationship between health and consumption in the previous year on membership to 
supplementary coverage (Equation 2). The third sub-section presents the characteristics of 
individuals who buy supplementary coverage, especially those related to the activities of 
primary and secondary prevention. 
 
4.1. Correlation test 
Following Fang et al. (2008), Table 2 presents the estimation of equation (1) using ordinary 
least squares where the dependent variable is the frequency of healthcare services 
consumption. The coefficient associated with having bought supplementary coverage in 2011 
remains positive for all estimates. It indicates that despite the inclusion of controls that are 
available to the econometrician but not to health insurers, there remains a positive correlation 
between private insurance and frequency of use of health services. These results suggest the 
presence of adverse selection, but may also include some moral hazard effects. Regarding the 
other coefficients these are generally consistent between different estimates; the presence of 
diseases is associated with increased consumption frequency of health services, and the same 
occurs for age and being female. 
 
4.2. Nature of the selection 
Table 3 presents the estimation of equation 2, showing the association between the frequency 
of use of healthcare services and expenses in the period preceding membership year with the 
probability of enrollment to supplementary coverage. This estimate allows us to eliminate the 
effect of moral hazard (increased consumption of services after insuring), so that the whole 
sample is used (in the left panel) and the sample excludes individuals who had supplementary 
                                                            
11 Through information regarding services consumed, four types of service related to activities of primary and 
secondary prevention were identified: vaccination services, PSA, mammography and cervical-vaginal cytology. 
12 Because we observe individuals before the purchase private insurance, we can isolate moral hazard effects. 
Thus the sign associated with ௜ܻ,௧ିଵ in equation (2) determines which type of selection is predominant in the 
voluntary insurance market. 
13 In particular, the characteristics of the individual related to activities of primary and secondary prevention and 
their relation to the purchase of supplementary insurance. 
health insurance in 2010 (right panel).14 We observe that health spending in 2010 is not 
associated with the purchase of private insurance in 2011. In contrast, females, older persons 
and those with a higher income are positively related to the purchase of supplementary 
insurance. Pathologies are negatively related to the purchase of supplementary insurance, 
which is consistent with the restrictive policy of insurance companies for the affiliation of 
people who already have some underlying condition (pre-existence). On the contrary, the use 
of hospital services in 2010 is positively associated with the purchase of private insurance in 
2011. 
This finding suggests the presence of adverse selection, where individuals have private 
information that insurers cannot observe and which increases the likelihood of insurance 
purchase. Moreover, this result is consistent despite the presence of diagnostic controls, that is, 
the risk selection strategies of insurers do not prevent adverse selection, as would appear to be 
the case in this context. 
	
4.3. Activities of primary and secondary prevention 
Finally, Table 4 shows the association of the activities of primary and secondary prevention of 
individuals in the previous year with the chance to buy supplementary health insurance in 
2011. This analysis is performed for the sample of men and women separately due to 
promotion and prevention activities being related exclusively to gender. It is noted that, 
controlling for socio-demographic and health characteristics, practicing one cervical Pap 
smear or having the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) are associated with an increased 
likelihood of buying supplementary health insurance. This finding contrasts with vaccination, 
where vaccination is associated with a decrease in the probability of buying supplementary 
health insurance in the previous year. 
Again, these findings corroborate the result of adverse selection because health insurers do not 
observe the frequency of consumption before the supplementary health insurance purchase, 
that is to say, this information is only known by the individual before affiliation to private 
insurance. In particular, when the primary prevention activities are positively correlated with 
the purchase of insurance, this indicates the existence of advantageous selection (lower-risk 
individuals are those who prefer higher coverage), on the other hand the negative correlation 
indicates adverse selection. We find that the correlation between vaccination in the previous 
year and supplementary health insurance remains negative across all estimates.15 
On the other hand, since people with some predispositions for some diseases are more willing 
to undertake secondary prevention actions,16 the positive correlation between the use of 
secondary prevention services and the purchase of supplementary insurance indicates the 
                                                            
14 With this the argument that the consumption of health services in 2010 is associated with having 
supplementary health insurance coverage in the same year is eliminated. 
15 The negative correlation between vaccination and the purchase of insurance can also be explained because this 
sample is composed of adults, and the use of vaccines in adults is related to the presence of comorbidities and 
specific health conditions (for example, patients with cancer, IRC, some transplants, etc., are vaccinated for 
different viral pathogens), which in turn correlate negatively with the purchase of insurance. 
16 For example, consider a case where the individual has a family history of prostate cancer or cervical cancer. 
This signal makes the individual more prone to the use of secondary activities for prevention to aid in early 
detection, thus allowing for more effective treatment. 
presence of adverse selection. Furthermore, in case of positive results, knowledge of the 
results of these tests can also make the individuals more prone to affiliation with broader 
coverage. 
	
5. Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that adverse selection is predominant in the Colombian supplementary 
health insurance market. Our empirical strategy allows us to rule out moral hazard effects. On 
the other hand, our results are corroborated by findings related to the behavior of individuals 
through the consumption of primary and secondary prevention. Another result of great value is 
that the risk selection strategies used by insurers do not prevent adverse selection. 
The nature of selection in the health insurance market (that is, what kind of individuals are 
more likely to purchase insurance) is of great importance for both the design of public policies 
related to insurance and the optimal design of policies in the private sector. Our results 
presented here provide a basis for decision-making related to the voluntary insurance market 
in Colombia. As pointed out in Buitrago and Bardey (2015), some of these policies may be 
related to the advisability or not of providing subsidies to private insurance or regulation 
strategies related to risk selection by health insurers. Our results suggest that subsidies for 
supplementary health insurance may decrease public expenses. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of individuals.  
Variable  Total 
Supplementary health insurance   
Yes  No   
Average  SD  Average  SD  Average  SD  p 
Age  37,14  11,88  43,07  12,22  36,94  11,82  *** 
Female  0,40  0,49  0,54  0,50  0,40  0,49  *** 
Average monthly income 2010  589.296,90   692.114,90   684.314,70   989.596,60   585.999,70   679.221,00   *** 
HT  0,10  0,31  0,09  0,29  0,10  0,31  *** 
CKD  0,01  0,08  0,00  0,05  0,01  0,08  *** 
DM  0,02  0,15  0,03  0,16  0,02  0,14  *** 
Cancer  0,02  0,13  0,01  0,12  0,02  0,13  *** 
Pneumonia  0,01  0,08  0,01  0,07  0,01  0,08   
UTI  0,06  0,24  0,05  0,21  0,06  0,24  *** 
Preeclampsia  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,02  0,00  0,05  *** 
Gastrointestinal disease  0,12  0,32  0,14  0,35  0,12  0,32  *** 
HRTI  0,06  0,24  0,04  0,20  0,06  0,25  *** 
COPD  0,01  0,10  0,01  0,11  0,01  0,10  *** 
Asthma  0,01  0,12  0,01  0,10  0,01  0,12  *** 
Mental disorder  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,00  0,04  *** 
Use of hospital services 2011  0,48  8,96  1,70  16,49  0,44  8,60  *** 
Use of ambulatory services 2011  8,21  12,25  9,87  14,67  8,16  12,16  *** 
Use of hospital services 2010  0,42  9,37  1,78  33,79  0,38  7,29  *** 
Use of ambulatory services 2010  7,43  11,19  9,09  13,93  7,37  11,08  *** 
Spending 2010  486.469,30   4.399.673,00   597.543,00   3.730.686,00   482.646,30   4.420.851,00   *** 
Spending 2011  557.202,50   4.123.044,00   672.578,60    2.949.511,00   553.231,30   4.157.489,00   *** 
Observations  484.005     15.376     468.629      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      SD: Standard Deviation; HT: Hypertension; CKD: Chronical Kidney Disease, DM; Diabetes Mellitus; UTI: Urinary Tract 
Infection; URTI: Upper Respiratory Tract Infection; COPD: Chronical Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. 
 
   
Table	2.	Effect	of	the	Supplementary	Health	Insurance	ሺSHIሻ	over	the	frequency	of	use	of	healthcare	
services	ሺEquation	1ሻ 
   Hospital services in 2011  Ambulatory services in 2011 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                          
SHI 2011  1.259***  0.875***  0.719***  0.571***  1.718*** 0.810***  ‐0.386*** 0.216** 
(0.134)  (0.141)  (0.150)  (0.145)  (0.120)  (0.121)  (0.128)  (0.103) 
SHI 2010  1.239***  1.037***  0.812***  2.929***  0.152  0.581*** 
(0.147)  (0.147)  (0.139)  (0.127)  (0.121)  (0.0953) 
Age  0.0228***  0.0104***  0.228***  0.0418***
(0.00200)  (0.00207)  (0.00200)  (0.00143) 
Female  0.324***  0.137***  5.258***  2.139*** 
(0.0317)  (0.0317)  (0.0404)  (0.0346) 
AMI 2010  ‐0.163***  ‐0.0792*  ‐1.481*** ‐0.453***
(0.0475)  (0.0461)  (0.0649)  (0.0517) 
Hospital services 2010  0.190***  0.0193***
(0.0209)  (0.00480) 
Ambulatory services 2010  0.0211***  0.531*** 
(0.00319)  (0.00405) 
HT  ‐0.265***  3.782*** 
(0.0700)  (0.0932) 
CKD  0.167  6.427*** 
(0.489)  (0.321) 
DM  1.215***  3.314*** 
(0.210)  (0.147) 
Cancer  0.870***  3.580*** 
(0.216)  (0.153) 
Pneumonia  2.457***  2.385*** 
(0.595)  (0.265) 
ITU  0.342***  2.454*** 
(0.100)  (0.0807) 
Preeclampsia  1.620***  0.298 
(0.575)  (0.652) 
Gastrointestinal disease  0.139**  2.818*** 
(0.0557)  (0.0754) 
URTI  ‐0.396***  1.998*** 
(0.0534)  (0.0662) 
COPD  0.984***  3.895*** 
(0.302)  (0.229) 
Asthma  0.127  2.181*** 
(0.206)  (0.158) 
Mental disorder  1.811***  4.683*** 
(0.701)  (0.471) 
Constant  0.443***  0.414***  1.632***  0.741  8.155*** 8.086***  17.60***  6.461*** 
(0.0126)  (0.0123)  (0.620)  (0.600)  (0.0178)  (0.0178)  (0.856)  (0.684) 
Municipality control  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  484,005  484,005  409,905  409,905  484,005  484,005  409,905  409,905 
R‐squared  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.049  0.001  0.002  0.088  0.404 
Robust standard errors  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SHI: Supplementary Health Insurance; AMI: Average Monthly Income; HT: Hypertension; CKD: Chronical Kidney Disease, 
DM; Diabetes Mellitus; UTI: Urinary Tract Infection; URTI: Upper Respiratory Tract Infection; COPD: Chronical 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease	 	
 
Table	3.	Characteristics	of	individuals	who	were	in	Supplementary	Health	Insurance	ሺSHIሻ.	
   Full sample 
Sample without individuals who had supplementary 
health insurance in 2010 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                          
Hospital services 2010  0.00458***  0.00317***  0.00322***  0.00325***  0.00422*** 0.00422***  0.00429***  0.00436*** 
(0.000578)  (0.000589)  (0.000609)  (0.000633)  (0.000656)  (0.000656)  (0.000681)  (0.000618) 
Ambulatory services 2010  0.0103***  0.00447***  ‐0.00416***  0.00194**  0.00336*** 0.00336***  ‐0.00677***  0.00162 
(0.000597)  (0.000678)  (0.000836)  (0.000871)  (0.000873)  (0.000873)  (0.00112)  (0.00113) 
SHI 2010  3.009***  2.809***  2.762*** 
(0.0197)  (0.0212)  (0.0214) 
Age  0.0241***  0.0279***  0.0226***  0.0271*** 
(0.000723)  (0.000776)  (0.000847)  (0.000912) 
Female  0.376***  0.386***  0.549***  0.559*** 
(0.0192)  (0.0194)  (0.0228)  (0.0230) 
AMI 2010  0.817***  0.791***  1.021***  0.993*** 
(0.0271)  (0.0271)  (0.0282)  (0.0281) 
HT  ‐0.509***  ‐0.630*** 
(0.0345)  (0.0443) 
CKD  ‐0.987***  ‐1.402*** 
(0.181)  (0.288) 
DM  0.00667  0.125* 
(0.0613)  (0.0756) 
Cancer  ‐0.404***  ‐0.520*** 
(0.0746)  (0.0975) 
Pneumonia  ‐0.179  ‐0.100 
(0.131)  (0.151) 
ITU  ‐0.334***  ‐0.414*** 
(0.0424)  (0.0511) 
Preeclampsia  ‐1.072***  ‐1.066*** 
(0.369)  (0.381) 
Gastrointestinal disease  0.0253  ‐0.0146 
(0.0273)  (0.0332) 
URTI  ‐0.400***  ‐0.462*** 
(0.0444)  (0.0533) 
COPD  ‐0.0282  ‐0.0857 
(0.0897)  (0.118) 
Asthma  ‐0.241**  ‐0.202* 
(0.0942)  (0.106) 
Mental disorder  ‐0.0370  ‐0.0392 
(0.182)  (0.236) 
Constant  ‐3.504***  ‐3.835***  ‐15.65***  ‐15.41***  ‐3.827***  ‐3.827***  ‐18.36***  ‐18.12*** 
(0.00975)  (0.0114)  (0.363)  (0.362)  (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.379)  (0.377) 
Municipality control  NO   NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Observations  484,005  484,005  409,905  409,905  467,777  467,777  393,677  393,677 
Robust standard errors  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SHI: Supplementary health insurance; AMI: Average Monthly Income; HT: Hypertension; CKD: Chronical Kidney Disease, 
DM; Diabetes Mellitus; UTI: Urinary Tract Infection; URTI: Upper Respiratory Tract Infection; COPD: Chronical 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease. 
	
	
	
	 	
Table	4. Activities	of	primary	and	secondary	prevention	and	relation	with	supplementary	
health	insurance	purchase.	
	
   FULL SAMPLE  Sample without individuals who had supplementary health insurance in 2010 
FEMALES  MALES  FEMALES  MALES 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                          
Pap smear  0.824***  0.783***     0.908***  0.885*** 
(0.0737)  (0.0747)     (0.0865)  (0.0876) 
Mammography  ‐0.0529  ‐0.0397     ‐0.0870*  ‐0.0558 
(0.0350)  (0.0357)     (0.0487)  (0.0497) 
PSA     0.255***  0.286***     0.231***  0.276*** 
   (0.0269)  (0.0282)     (0.0390)  (0.0406) 
Vaccination  ‐0.946***  ‐0.857***  ‐0.313**  ‐0.0278  ‐1.002***  ‐0.919***  ‐0.106  0.119 
(0.106)  (0.102)  (0.157)  (0.145)  (0.125)  (0.122)  (0.190)  (0.184) 
Age  0.0300***  0.0362***  0.0410***  0.0493***  0.0132***  0.0190***  0.0276***  0.0349*** 
(0.00103)  (0.00116)  (0.00125)  (0.00135)  (0.00133)  (0.00150)  (0.00159)  (0.00171) 
AMI 2010  0.985***  0.933***  0.868***  0.809***  1.265***  1.214***  1.064***  1.011*** 
(0.0399)  (0.0399)  (0.0424)  (0.0427)  (0.0458)  (0.0458)  (0.0496)  (0.0499) 
Hospital services 2010  0.00608***  0.00333***  0.00528***  0.00341*** 
(0.000869)  (0.000742)  (0.000977)  (0.000799) 
Ambulatory services 2010  0.00389***  0.00292*  0.00165  0.000742 
(0.00110)  (0.00162)  (0.00158)  (0.00217) 
Constant  ‐17.26***  ‐16.69***  ‐16.74***  ‐16.18***  ‐20.72***  ‐20.11***  ‐19.20***  ‐18.68*** 
(0.538)  (0.537)  (0.566)  (0.570)  (0.619)  (0.619)  (0.662)  (0.665) 
        
Municipality control  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Diagnosis control  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Observations  140,476  140,476  170,561  170,561  132,879  132,879  165,248  165,248 
Robust standard errors  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
AMI: Average Monthly Income; PSA: Prostate‐Specific Antigen. 
